From Text to Literature: New Analytic and Pragmatic Approaches
So convincing is the connection between schizophrenia and the pragmatic level of language that some clinicians measure the schizophrenic's language disturbance on a scale of pragmatic functioning. He measures an individual's relative level of pragmatic ability by the nature and frequency of his or her violations of Gricean conversational maxims - rules of discourse we all follow unconsciously in our daily interactions.
He uses the maxims to "assess conversational behaviour that undermines the effective generation of implied meanings by producing inappropriate noncompliance with conversational rules" such as providing neither too much nor too little information to your interlocutor "Quantity" His results show that schizophrenic subjects scored higher on the scale of pragmatic impairment Various theories about the genesis of pragmatic disorders such as those presented in schizophrenia prevail today.
Social inference theory says that those with pragmatic disorders have an impaired ability to conceptualize other people's mental states in their language planning Martin , the weak central coherence hypothesis suggests that the pragmatically impaired cannot use context to separate relevant from irrelevant information and the executive dysfunction account of pragmatic disorders says that the problem lies in the frontal lobes of the brain, leading to difficultly in planning behavior, disinhibition and over-stimulation Other scholars have looked a whether or not pragmatic difficulties are secondary to generalized cognitive decline in schizophrenics Linscott For our purposes, the genesis of this pragmatic disorder makes very little difference.
What is relevant from the point of view of literary study is the reality of these pragmatic malfunctions in the language of the schizophrenic and what each of these individual violations of normal pragmatic rules indicate about the schizophrenic's worldview; the schizophrenic's willingness or ability to represent reality as it is seen and experienced by his or her interlocutor is significantly impaired.
When the speaker's immediate physical reality ceases to serve as a basis of reference for his or her speech, a fundamentally altered relationship between the signifier and signified is implied. Irigaray writes, "The association of signified and signifier in the sign no longer obeys the law of the arbitrary. The play, the free will, of the law of the arbitrary, is missing from schizophrenic language. Paradoxically, this results in the interpretation of what the schizophrenic says as unmotivated, gratuitous and unfounded" The schizophrenic need not call objects what those around him or her do.
Among other things, the loss of significance of the real here and now - reality as experienced by a "sane" person - as a point of reference means the loss of normal temporal values in the schizophrenic's language and thought. Karl Jaspers, in his now-dated General Psychopathology , contains some fascinating examples of how the schizophrenic experiences time, including a heightened awareness of the moment, discontinuous time losing time, being unaware of the passing of time and feeling time stop or reverse direction When one considers that the schizophrenic need not call objects what the majority of speakers do, nor respect the same rules of time, one can better understand the genesis of some of the idiosyncrasies of schizophrenic speech.
In the same work, Jaspers elucidates the possibilities the schizophrenic's pragmatic "inability" creates for his or her poetics. The patients do not report their experiences, persecutions and other personal facts, but develop theories, new cosmic systems, new religions, new interpretations of the Bible, or of universal problems, etc. Given that Khlebnikov's early texts showed evidence of a pragmatic pathology, confirming his psychiatrist's preliminary diagnosis of schizophrenia, it makes sense now to look for further confirmation of this pragmatic disorder in his later works.
In his "Russia and Me" ["Ia i Rossiia"] we see Khlebnikov's lyric I generalized to all of Russia, where the protagonist's removal of his shirt is likened to Russia's liberation of the serfs. The speaker's control of the fates of the world is made corporeal in the poem, as by exposing his bare chest, he gives sunlight to the masses, who form the very hairs of his body. Russia has granted freedom to thousands and thousands It was really a terrific thing to do, people will never forget it.
But what I did was take off my shirt and all those shiny skyscrapers the strands of my hair, every pore in the city of my body, broke out their banners and flags. All the citizens, all the men and women of the government of ME, rushed to the windows of my thousand-windowed hair, all those Igors and Olgas and nobody told them to do it, there were ecstatic at the sunshine and peeked through my skin.
CW 3 94 The speaker's body is not merely gargantuan; this "state of ME" includes an actual population of individual citizens. The body of this lyric I thereby incorporates not only the resolution of a nation's struggle, but the struggling people of the nation themselves. I stood on a beach with no clothes on, that's how I gave freedom to my people and suntans to the masses. But this kind of deictic collapse, in which I and they become one, is not atypical for schizophrenic language.
Scholars have noted problems with "ego reference" Irigaray 71 , which can range from avoidance of the first person in speech Irigaray to an "avoidance of relationship between the persons specific to the enunciation I-you " , to the use of I to designate "the formal paradigm of all speaking subjects […] or it represents the subject of a narrative of a narrative, a form of reported utterance" In his "You whose mind flowed" ["Ty zhe, chei razum stekal"] we see this narcissistic gesture repeated, along with a marked shift in pronoun reference.
The poem begins by addressing a grandiose you: You whose mind flowed like a gray waterfall over the pastoral life of early antiquity, whose numbers enchanted a serpent docilely rolling in hoops of jealousy, and the hoop and hiss and whistle of the dance and spasms of the snake in trance made you hear the sun's bright thistle more and more clearly as song. CW 3 61 The poetic subject is able to mesmerize animals with his mind, and has the uncanny ability to "hear the sun".
This endowment of the poetic subject with strange and god-like powers continues into its second half, where the poem's subject abruptly becomes an I: I wear the whole of Planet Earth on the little finger of my right hand, and I speak to you. I shout out shout after shout and a wild raven, a sacred thing, builds her nest in my curdling shout and her nestlings grow, and the snail of centuries crawls across my hand stretched out to the stars.
And it is the physical body of this I upon which time and space are built. Also typical of the schizophrenic's deictic pathology is the dominance of connotative over denotative meaning that we saw earlier in Khlebnikov's "Numbers".
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One might cite here Roman Jakobson's account of Khlebnikov's use of simile: "[W]e may characterize the simile as one of the methods for introducing into the poetic situation an order of facts not occasioned by the logical movement of the narration. Xlebnikov's similes are hardly ever motivated by any impression of real similarity of objects, but are simply compositional effects" But the example Jakobson cites from Esir shows a connotative connection between the elements the simile connects: Like a black sail on the white sea its fierce pupils cut the eyes aslant: the frightening white eyes were raised toward the brows in the head of the dead one hanging by a braid.
The comparison of sea and sail in the simile is not illogical, but rather follows a non-denotative logic. But perhaps no problem of reference is more typical of schizophrenic language than a disordered representation of time. Scholars have noted this temporal malfunction in an avoidance of terms "here" and "now" with the present tense Irigaray , and in more general reports of a "discontinuity of time" Jaspers As Wrobel writes that in moments of "schizophrenic illumination" "a lineal sense of time disappears, and past and future connect with the present, creating a constant now" This account of the schizophrenic's temporal flexibility fits well with Khlebnikov's laws of time.
Petrovskii writes about his creation of "The Society of " - the rulers of the State of Time - that Khlebnikov he hoped to attract to its ranks "the best people of his time, and by establishing communication throughout the terrestrial globe, to dictate to the governments of Space" So serious was Khlebnikov about the revolutionary potentials of the State of Time that he actually invited notables such as Viacheslav Ivanov to become members and discussed possible locations for their headquarters Petrovskii 14; Samarodova In his evolving theories of time, one can see the loss of linear time that Wrobel describes as typical of schizophrenic thought and language.
In its place arises a theory of time in which past, present and future are all of a piece. The experience of time in Khlebnikov's literary works is persuasive on this account. One finds explicit evidence of Khlebnikov's externalization of time in his dramatic poem Burgling the Universe [Vzlom vselennoi] In the poem, a young man characterizes his dealings with time in the following monologue: I gathered old books, Gathered a harvest of numbers with the curved sickle of my mind, Watered them with my thoughts; hunched and wrinkled, I put them to rest in the sky The pillars of song on the sea shore, I situated and populated with the song and life of youth The white temples of time, hewn from a dead sea.
SS 4 77 The young man asserts his power to posit time. In the form of "white temples", time is an external object, the building materials of a structure which the young man erects. Further, following this externalization of time, he has not only the power to mold it, but to subvert it: My mind is exact to the nth degree, Like heart's coal, I endowed the dead prophet of the universe With breath from the breast of the universe, And suddenly understood: there is no time.
Raised up on wings like an eagle, I saw simultaneously what was and what would be, A mainspring of threes and twos In a ferrous strawman of worlds, The elastic murmur of numbers. And it became clear to me What would come to be. In the poem these formulae actually take the place of time after the young man realizes it does not exist. This new formula-based temporal entity behaves very differently from time as we know it, taking on a material and visible form like that in "You whose mind flowed" and a multi-directional flow.
A simultaneous past and future is the logical consequence of Khlebnikov's laws of time. Arapova's account confirms this description - "He said that on the basis of calculations it was possible to foretell any global event both of the past and the future - if you took invariability and repeatability as laws" Khlebnikov was here describing his monumental Tables of Fate [Doski sud'by] , which use these formulae he had made his life's work as algorithms for predicting the events of the future based on the past.
These equations generate simultaneity in the sense of a sameness or repeated quality of the past in the future. Petrovskii comments on Khlebnikov's simultaneous time - "As always, Khlebnikov breathed in centuries. All that surrounded him preoccupied him not with its present, but with its past and future. He would photograph the moment of the run of the future into the past and back. His theories of reoccurring points in time, the rhythm of the universe, and the rhythm of history, are well known" All of these problems with deixis evinced by Khlebnikov's theoretical and literary writings, come with intriguing philosophical implications.
Covington's summary of the schizophrenic's problems with reference as "an overall lack of cohesion" 97 brings closer what is at stake in the schizophrenic's particular language disorder - a flaunting of the rules of discourse that we all take for granted. Crow's research, which attempts to understand schizophrenia as the most human of illnesses, indicates why the schizophrenic's language is so fascinating hypothesizing that "the problem is intrinsic to the human capacity for language, and that this faculty is variable between individuals.
It is precisely the interruption along the path from thought to speech that his work demonstrates that seems to have captivated so many readers of Khlebnikov's work. He points out the arbitrary conventions of speech by his flaunting of them. What he provoked naturally as a result of linguistic pathology struck a nerve with those of his contemporaries who were at that very moment contemplating the conventions of speech and literature and whether or not they were adequate to the new century and its challenges.
In giving voice to his own unconscious, he inspired those around him to question rational models of creativity and plumb the depths of their own. Part 2: Khlebnikov in conversation with his peers The evidence of consistent pragmatic inability in Khlebnikov's literary and theoretical writings has indicated that he uses language in a manner typical of one suffering from schizophrenia. Given such strong textual evidence for a pragmatic incapacity, the question then becomes how Khlebnikov was able to become the guiding light of Futurism his colleagues described and continues to exercise tremendous influence in the history of Russian literature.
In his famous "existential-phenomenological" account of schizophrenia, R. Laing quotes Jung as saying that "the schizophrenic ceases to be schizophrenic when he meets someone by whom he feels understood" Jung's plea for empathy in interacting with the schizophrenic may have been ahead of its time. Speech therapists and school psychologists have found recently that they are able to better diagnose their language-impaired clients when they changed their criteria of language fluency to hinge on communicative competence.
When they made communication their focus - the child's ability to generate and understand narrative deemed meaningful by his or her peers - the list of factors that had to be considered in diagnosis expanded to include the child's context and relative social development Simon Researchers found that this shift to pragmatic criteria led to more students being referred to the school's speech pathologist with far greater accuracy than had previous grammatical criteria Damico A switch to pragmatic diagnostic criteria means taking into account what all discourse participants contribute to the success or failure of a communication.
Rather than isolating the client as sick, as did traditional grammar-based diagnosticians, all parties now come under scrutiny as part of a pathological communication. In the classroom-setting, the introduction of pragmatic criteria to language assessment revealed that often teachers held some responsibility for communication failures, for example, in expecting metalinguistic knowledge i. Some mental health professionals outside the school system are likewise considering whether or not adopting a communicative competency based model might serve their needs better when dealing with language impaired clients such as aphasics and schizophrenics.
Here, the idea that meaning is co-created is applied to therapy, meaning that it is no longer just the client who must try to understand the therapist's idiom; the therapist, too, must strive for greater sensitivity in his or her language use and in making sense of the client's statements.
Ferguson writes that "the recognition of the dynamic nature of communication involves a shift from focussing on just one of the individuals in the exchange, to a focus on the jointly shared responsibility for communication of all participants […] When we recognise that messages are jointly constructed, competence can be seen as an emergent property of the exchange, rather than a quality residing in an individual" If the goal of this emerging field of clinical pragmatics is to "characterize clients' communicative behaviour and ability with a view to diagnosis and remediation by considering not only the role of the client in communication but also of the context of situation and of those interacting with the client" Smith 44 , the question then becomes what pragmatic therapy should look like.
Not surprisingly, given the unpredictable character of communication, coming up with general guidelines has proven difficult. Research clinicians have experimented with various techniques to ensure that the client both initiates and responds in the clinical encounter, creating a more "natural conversation" between clinician and client Meilijson , including asking him or her to create a narrative text in response to visual stimuli Smith , as well as devising ways to place a greater burden of comprehension on the therapist - Kepinski has suggested that professionals treating schizophrenics create idiolect dictionaries of their client's lexicon.
To an extent, all of these discourse-based diagnostic and therapeutic models draw on "phenomenological-anthropological" psychiatry's view of schizophrenia and its ensuing disordered language.tramemlaiwolfsuc.cf/the-wizarding-world-of-harry-potter-a-field.php
As Wrobel explains, "this school does not accept the existing division into psychogenic and endogenous illnesses, and thus schizophrenia is treated as a specific form of being" 10 He describes the work of early twentieth century psychiatrists who sought to "go beyond the treatment of psychotic experiences from the point of view of logic.
When one accepts the social genesis of logic, communication with the schizophrenic seems less daunting. His or her violations of its rules become a question of a different idiom rather than an intellectual defect. These recommendation for clinicians on how to alter their language behaviors and expectation to enable more meaningful conversation with their language-impaired clients sound very much like the modifications that Khlebnikov's friends and peers made naturally.
Nadezhda Mandelstam describes taking extraordinary care in her speech so as not to offend the very sensitive Khlebnikov. She recounts that, despite the fact that he only liked "bits and pieces" of his work, her husband "never showed as much care and concern for anyone else as he did for Khlebnikov" Khlebnikov's friends took the same care with his person as they did their conversations with them - a critical gesture since Khlebnikov was notoriously careless with his own physical well-being.
Nikolai Aseev writes that "[o]ne couldn't imagine another person who cared less of himself. He would forget about food, the cold, about the smallest human comforts like gloves, galoshes, the arrangement of his life, earnings and comfort. It wasn't because he didn't have any practical ability or human needs. No, he simply couldn't be bothered with them. He filled all his time with contemplation, plans and projects" Aleksei Kruchenykh points out the importance of Khlebnikov's friends in keeping the poet going: "Impractical Velimir didn't obtain material gain from his works and spent his whole life as a semi-indigent wanderer; were it not for the help of friends, he would have been starving and homeless" Maintaining Khlebnikov seems to have been an unspoken group ethos for the Futurians and their collaborators.
Not only did Khlebnikov rely on his friends and colleagues perhaps unwittingly for material and emotional support, without their assistance Khlebnikov's poetry would never have seen the light of day. Nearly every peer's description of Khlebnikov as a writer mentions the extraordinary lack of care he devoted to his manuscripts. Aseev describes the chaos of Khlebnikov's "studio": "Khlebnikov conducted his creative housekeeping carelessly […] He had and lost his notes, having neither the means nor space to organize his work. Drafts of his manuscripts were often lost and he had several kinds of blank paper.
Often, because of a lack of paper, he would jot down various ideas on one sheet of paper" The chaos Aseev describes reveals an important fact about Khlebnikov's published oeuvre - that it had its genesis in collaboration. In his obituary of the poet, Vladimir Maiakovskii quickly disabuses readers who might have thought Khlebnikov played a managerial role in the movement of their illusions. Practically speaking, Khlebnikov was disorganized. Never in his life did he publish one thing on his own […] Gorodetskii credits him with everything from organizational talent to the creation of Futurism to publishing "A Slap in the Face".
Nothing could be further from the truth. Even "A Trap for Judges" , with Khlebnikov's first verses, and "Slap" were organized by David Burliuk […] for Khlebnikov, who rarely had his own trousers […], his lack of materialism took on the character of real asceticism and martyrdom for a poetic idea. Sometimes, as Mikhail Matiushin describes, Khlebnikov would even hinder the publication of his own work.
But because these 'publishers' were his friends Guro and I, Kruchenykh, D. Burliuk everything was worked out peacefully with a few laughs" Khlebnikov's inner circle admits that the poet's extreme lack of organization and disregard for his own manuscript went one step further; once a piece was written, Khlebnikov could not have cared less what was done to it.
According to Vasilii Kamenskii, Khlebnikov's typical response to a request to recite one of his works was to say the first four lines before quietly concluding, "And so forth" Maiakovskii continues, "Khlebnikov doesn't have poems. The completeness of his published works is a fiction. The appearance of completeness, more often than not, is the work of his friends.
We selected from the heaps of manuscripts he strew those that seemed to us the most valuable and published them. Sometimes the end of one draft got stuck to the back of another, inciting joyful incomprehension in Khlebnikov. He could never submit himself to editing - he'd cross out everything in its entirety and create a completely new text" David Burliuk confirms the "chaotic" state of Khlebnikov's manuscripts: "Khlebnikov's manuscripts were a chaotic heap of crumpled sheets of paper, covered in minute writing" Kamenskii As he describes it, Khlebnikov's indifference about the fate of his own finished manuscripts was part of a more general disregard for the sanctity of the individual artist.
He recounts one of his earliest meetings with Khlebnikov. I humbly presented them to him. All of the sudden, to my surprise, Velimir settled himself and began adding his own lines above, below and around my own. This was one of Khlebnikov's characteristic features: his creativity flared up with the smallest spark" All of these accounts of Khlebnikov's life and work resonate with the pragmatists' theories about modifying one's behavior with the language disordered.
Interlocutors like Nadezhda Mandelstam tailored their linguistic behavior to him and friends took care of his physical health. Friends and colleagues carried these adapted expectations over into the literary milieu where they literally co-created meaning with Khlebnikov. They modified their notion of authorship, editing and shepherding Khlebnikov's work to publication. At times the ceded their own individual authorship, as did Kruchenykh in his frequent if challenging collaborations with the poet. What makes his friends' devotion to his physical, mental and literary well-being even more remarkable is that caring for Khlebnikov like a child lowered him in no one's estimation.
Behaviors that were made necessary by Khlebnikov's odd interpersonal behavior often became part of Futurist practice. If collaborating with Khlebnikov was a necessity to get his manuscripts out of the trashcan and into print, it became a matter of choice among the members of the movement in their many group-authored manifestoes and dramatic pieces. Despite his many weaknesses, his peers frequently proclaimed Khlebnikov the guiding light of the futurist movement. Maiakovskii not only called him "the most sincere knight" in their "poetic struggle" but "the Columbus of new poetic lands" that his fellow Futurians and the philologists of OPOIAZ were now "settling and cultivating" Jakobson famously named Khlebnikov "the greatest world poet of our century What drew these mentally more stable artists and theoreticians to Khlebnikov was precisely what made him so helpless in the first place - his single-minded devotion to his thoughts and theories.
It was not just new ways of thinking about language and time that captivated Khlebnikov's peers but his complete investment in these ideas. Nikolai Gumilev writes, [Khlebnikov's] images are cogent in their absurdity, his thoughts in their paradoxallity. It's like he sees his verses in his sleep and then writes them down, preserving all of the incongruity of their chain of events.
In this respect one could compare him to Alexei Remizov, who transcribed his dreams. But Remizov was a theoretician; he smoothed their contours, traced them in thick lines with a dark marker to highlight the significance of the logic of the "dream". Khlebnikov preserves all of the [dream's] nuances and what his verses lose in literary quality they gain in depth. He did not arrive at his trans-rational ideas rationally but irrationally - here, in dreams. For Khlebnikov, method and message were one and the same, creating a figure of the modernist ethos without parallel.
While one could not easily create this kind of disconnect from reality and social conventions in themselves, they could certainly nourish and enable someone who came across this talent naturally. Sometimes even his closest circle underestimated his commitment to his theories. Rita Rait, an acquaintance of the poet, recounts an unfortunate experience in Kharkov in , when Sergei Esenin and Anatoli Mariengoff decided to crown Khlebnikov the King of Time as a joke. I can't describe how they crowned him king - I don't remember.
There remains only the unbearable feeling of shame at this whole comedy, pity for our friend, muttering something under his breath, some ring they put on his finger - to the laughter of the public - and then, behind the scenes - a confused, hurt, weeping Khlebnikov - they took the ring from him. This was all on purpose and he believed it" It is precisely this confluence of the creative philosophies of the mentally ill and the futurist movement in art and literature that E. Radin explores in his pamphlet, Futurism and Madness where most of his examples come from Khlebnikov's work.
He notes similar experiments in word formation, visual logic, and child-like expression. Near the end of the piece he proclaims that "children, the mentally ill and Futurists are a new triad" He explains the connection thusly: "[Their] concentration on the word, without respect to its content, leads both one and the other to create riddles and to conduct speculative experiments in the field of language. In the search for the laws of word formation, numbers and forms, they revive the scholastic method" Radin takes great care in characterizing the relationship between the three, particularly the nature of the connection between futurism and mental illness.
There isn't enough data for this. A parallel isn't proof. But the similarity of their starting points - the region of the subconscious - leads to close contiguity in the creativity of the mentally ill and the Futurists" One should take the same care in defining the connection between Khlebnikov's mental state and that of his Futurian peers.
However enraptured they may have been by the poet's experiments and his person, Khlebnikov's fellow Futurians did not suffer from the same accompanying mental malady. Kamenskii describes a New Year's party in where, with Khlebnikov's whiskers drawn on his face, he ""predicted the future of everyone present based on Khlebnikov's mathematical studies" , making Mayakovskii and Shklovskii laugh so hard they fell out of their chairs. Kruchenykh recounts another revealing encounter with the poet towards the end of his life: In in Moscow he furtively informed me about his discoveries, confiding -- The English would pay a lot to make sure these calculations aren't published!
I laughed and assured Khlebnikov that the English didn't give a fig, despite the fact that the Tables of Fate threatened them with death, unsuccessful wars, the loss of fleets, etc. Khlebnikov was offended, but nevertheless, still clearly not dissuaded. But was he really a lunatic? He was certainly by no means normal but he really played the role of a lunatic, profiting by his lunacy" Bunin may raise a valid point about the reality of Khlebnikov's mental predicament, which is admittedly impossible to verify from our current position.
(PDF) Pragmatism and Literature | Wojciech Malecki - ixukokiburem.tk
However, it bears repeating that a verifiable diagnosis of schizophrenia is not so important in this context. What is important is the extent to which Khlebnikov's mental state and literary reputation were inextricable to his contemporaries. They were two sides of the same coin.
The one professional opinion left to us on this account - Anfimov's case study of Khlebnikov - confirms this state of affairs. Aside from adopting a tone generally more poetic and personal than one would ever find in the case notes of a mental health professional today, Anfimov departs from our expectations of a psychiatrist in exploring Khlebnikov's mental state through poetry. Anfimov assigned the poet three themes in order to study the "peculiarities of fantasy": "the hunt, moonlight and the carnival" Khlebnikov returned three pieces of different genres, all of them, Anfimov writes, "original works of the great wordsmith, albeit bearing the hallmark of pathological creation" For Anfimov, too, Khlebnikov's greatness as a poet originated in his troubled mind.
Khlebnikov's contemporaries - both his supporters and detractors - understood the connection between his mental state and his creative voice. Username Password Forgot password? Shibboleth OpenAthens. Restore content access Restore content access for purchases made as guest. Article Purchase - Online Checkout. Issue Purchase - Online Checkout. People also read Article. Published online: 15 Mar Published online: 20 Sep Published online: 6 Jul Against this, Sellars describes the emerging new configuration of the analytic work of philosophy as follows: "For 'analysis' no longer connotes the definition of terms, but rather the clarification of the logical structure-in the broadest sense- of discourse, and discourse no longer appears as one plane parallel to another, but as a tangle of intersecting dimensions whose relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to no single or simple pattern.
With this a new structure of the disciplinary matrix of philosophy steps into view, which no longer is hierarchically centered on an fundamental discipline, but rather operates in the fashion of a network. In this sense Sellars emphasizes: "No longer can the philosopher interested in perception say 'let him who is interested in prescriptive discourse analyze its concepts and leave me in peace.
Against this background, the relation of philosophy and science also changes for Sellars. When philosophy is no longer only responsible for the atomistic analyses and definitions of the individual scientific terms, but rather aims collectively at the holistic analysis of the relational inner dependencies of everyday, scientific, and philosophical discourse, that is, when it is to be understood as a "discourse-about-man-in-all-discourse," 30 then "familiarity with the trend of scientific thought is essential to the appraisal of the framework categories of the common-sense picture of the world.
But at the same it remains certain for Sellars that a holistic philosophy that aims "toward that articulated and integrated vision of man-in-the-universe" 32 remains structurally separated from the sciences. This is the case insofar as it makes this vision in a specifically philosophic way its object. Philosophical activity as such remains for Sellars-as opposed to Quine, Davidson, and Rorty-methodologically separated from the research practices of science. This becomes clear when one views the above-quoted passage in its context.
It reads: "The procedures of philosophical analysis as such may make no use of the methods or results of the sciences. But familiarity with the trend of scientific thought is essential to the appraisal of the framework categories of the common-sense picture of the world. It is otherwise for Quine. In Word and Object , Quine simply remarks: "And philosophy? Thus Quine describes the program, developed in his main work Word and Object , of a "naturalized epistemology," 39 in his essay of the same name, as an undertaking that not only dislodges "epistemology from its old status of first philosophy," 40 but beyond this also brings it about that "epistemology merges with psychology, as well as with linguistics.
At the same time it is important to see that the dissolution defended by Quine of the border between philosophy and science does not aim at a new determination of philosophical activity as such. In Quine's view the disciplinary matrix of philosophy can be entwined with the empirical sciences like psychology or linguistics, without the original purpose of epistemology thereby running into danger. This purpose is, according to Quine, not only not betrayed by the naturalization movement he promotes, but on the contrary cured of its traditional aporiae and thus for the first time made actually realizable in a progressive way.
This self assessment of Quine's becomes especially clear in his demarcation of the late Wittgenstein and the therapeutic current running through linguistic philosophy. Quine writes, "Wittgenstein and his followers, mainly at Oxford, found a residual philosophical vocation in therapy: in curing philosophers of the delusion that there were epistemological problems. But I think that at this point it may be more useful to say rather that epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a clarified status.
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. The holding fast to the presupposition of continually writing off the theoreticist conception of philosophical activity-supported at different times by Quine and Sellars respectively-refers back again to the fact that their thought moves within the framework of the second ambivalence. The behavioristic naturalism that Quine and Sellars developed as a new paradigm of philosophical research is related back by them to the fundamental questions of modern academic tradition, i.
They boast of it in different ways: Sellars, in that he newly structures the disciplinary matrix of philosophy, thereby at the same time securing the discipline in its academic identity from outside; and Quine, in that he brings the borders of the disciplines into a trans-disciplinary movement, all the while adhering to the basic epistemological alignment of philosophical activity, and placing the sciences in the service of this theoretical alignment.
In this respect the situation in the thought of Donald Davidson is different than with in that of Sellars and Quine. Davidson overcomes the second ambivalence of the linguistic turn, in that he conceives the task of philosophy neither as problem-solving nor as problem-dissolving, but rather starts out from an understanding of philosophy that is transformative in the strong sense, i. That connects with Rorty, who at the same time stands for a transformative understanding of philosophy in the strongest sense, according to which philosophical activity is itself to be determined as transformative.
In his influential essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" Davidson developed, on the basis of his critique of the "dualism of scheme and content," 46 the twisting point within the linguistic turn for Rorty's suggestions for the development a pragmatic vocabulary of philosophy. The original scene of this questioning for Davidson is a result of the simple idea "of [an] organizing system and something waiting to be organized.
The dogmatic determination of philosophical achievement as a reflexive scheme analysis is juxtaposed by Davidson against his own position of a holistic coherence theory: "What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the request for a ground of source of justification of another ilk.
As a consequence of dismissing the scheme-content dualism, Davidson limits himself to the behavioristic perspective of the linguistic field researcher, which Quine had already introduced in Word and Object. By doing this, he brings about at the same time definite alterations in the way Quine models the activity of the field linguist. For Davidson, what are from the ethnocentric perspective of the linguist to be described as physical objects, and to which the natives acting as test-subjects are linguistically conditioned, take the place of the nervous stimuli claimed by Quine as neutral reference points.
Davidson's radical interpretation theory aims from the external perspective of the field linguist at external causes, i. In this way it is clear to Davidson's linguistic ethnologist that there is no neutral procedure at his or her disposal for the description of these causes. The linguistic ethnologist can only attempt to fit, as best possible, the convictions that he or she assumes the speakers he is investigating, to those convictions he or she brings to the situation him or herself. The linguistic field researcher is thus at the same time conscious that radical interpretation begins at home.
He or she knows that, as far as the relation existing between his or her own beliefs and the world is concerned, "there is nothing more to be known? The situation of so called "triangulation" 56 is, according to Davidson, characteristic of both the field linguist's going out into the unknown as well as of the acquisition of his or her mother tongue, which comes about as a child at home. This is because in both cases it holds that "[the] identification of the objects of thought rests, then, on a social basis," 57 i.
Success at the first level is achieved to the extent that the leaner responds with sounds the teacher finds similar to situations the teacher finds similar. The teacher is responding to two things: the external situation and the responses of the learner. The learner is responding to two things: the external situation and the responses of the teacher. Thus the essential triangle is formed which makes communication about shared objects and events possible.
Under the conditions of a linguistic turn that remains under the spell of the scheme-content dualism, linguistic competence in part still with Wittgenstein, but especially with Quine and Sellars was understood as the introspectively investigating capacity to form contents inside a differentially structured or holistically conceived scheme, and thereby to make something distinguishable and identifiable as something.
This view is juxtaposed by Davidson against the provocative thesis "that there is no such thing as a language. Against this Davidson suggests that we, "think of linguistic competence as a kind of know-how," 67 i. It is this aspect of the way he uses "pragmatic" that Rorty first highlights in his interpretation of Davidson. This emphasis is made explicit in Davidson's suggestion that we should remove "the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally. According to Davidson, a new typological determination of philosophical activity becomes possible under the conditions of a pragmatized understanding of language, which makes Davidson a transformative philosopher in the strong sense.
While Quine takes the empirical work of the field linguist to be oriented toward the philosophical service of a pre-given epistemological questioning, Davidson understands philosophical activity as an activity that does not already have its goal determined from outside, but rather attains this determination in new ways in the mist of the work of the field linguist.
Philosophy can thus, from Davidson's perspective, bring into the research context of the field linguist logical tools that spring from Davidson's application to natural languages of the Tarskian theory of truth.
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Nevertheless-so Davidson believes-no second, possibly genuine philosophical perspective is added to or propped up on the perspective of the field linguist. On the contrary, the typological transformation of philosophical activity, which Davidson supports on the basis of the situation of triangulation that he moves to the foreground, consists precisely in the fact that the philosophical perspective is dissolved in the contingent external perspective of the field linguist, who works empirically with the formal set of tools and thereby determines anew and in non-reductionistic ways scientific activity itself.
Davidson and Rorty share the opinion that the pragmatic naturalization of philosophy of language and epistemology is to be radicalized beyond Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Quine. Also common to both is the diagnosis and the affirmative realization of a "sea change in contemporary philosophical thought," 69 connected with the establishment of the pragmatic vocabulary in philosophy.
Nevertheless, different from Davidson, the pragmatic naturalization of Rorty leads to a transformative conception of philosophical activity in the strongest sense. According to this conception, philosophy becomes an epistemological experiment aimed at making possible future changes in common sense.
Against this Davidson understands himself as a champion of a typological change that is less radical than the suggestions of Rorty. His hermeneutic naturalism aims at establishing a philosophical-linguistic type of inquiry that for all its naturalistic embeddedness is nevertheless to be designated as genuinely theoretical in the sense of descriptive observation.
From text to literature : new analytic and pragmatic approaches
This is because from Davidson's view, the inquiries of the philosophically versed field linguist do not aim at the change of the linguistic reality. Rather, Davidson's work is concerned with the empirically founded and hermeneutically relativized description of various natural languages, which are grasped as pragmatic tools of interaction. Against this backdrop, Davidson's analytic antirepresentationalism , which aims at the formal-logical reconstruction of natural languages' truth theories without recurring thereby introspectively to representational tertia, allows itself to be differentiated by Rorty's pronounced transformative pragmatism.
The latterrenounces the instruments of symbolic logic, because it does not aim at the descriptive analysis of existing forms of interaction, but rather at the politically and socially motivated transformation of future rules of action. In contrast to Davidson Rorty does not orientate his approach on the model of science, but rather on models that he takes from the cultural domains of literature and art and transfers over to science.
The related socio-political perspectivization of Rorty's recommended pragmatic vocabulary is still not contained in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and in Consequences of Pragmatism.
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Rorty first develops it in the later works, published in the nineties, which grew out of his late major work Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty has described the basic strategic idea of these works as follows: "In short, my strategy? The humanistic embeddedness of philosophical activity, which is expressed in this strategy, stands at the center of Rorty's in the strongest sense transformative pragmatism. It marks a usage of "pragmatic" according to which the adjective means something like "oriented toward the socio-political realization of the ideals of democratic enlightenment.
The opposition introduced by Rorty between representationalism and antirepresentationalism is to be distinguished from the difference originating from Michael Dummett between realism and antirealism. In Rorty's use, the difference between realistic picture theories of knowledge and antirealistic construction theories of knowledge does not serve as a synonym for the opposition between representationalism and antirepresentationalism, but rather as an inner difference, in which this distinction gets worked out within the area of representationalist positions.
Rorty explicitly emphasizes this when he writes: "I claim that the representationalism-vs. In his more recent publications, Rorty uses the correspondence theory of truth in both its underlying variants as the central characteristic of representationalism: "There is no point to debates between realism and anti-realism, for such debates presuppose the empty and misleading idea of beliefs 'being made true'. Even though realistic picture-theories and antirealistic constructionisms apply different criteria of adequation and presuppose different concepts of reality, both remain within the paradigm of a representationalism that aims at correspondence.
While the adequation of a representation is determined picture-theoretically by its relation to a represented transcendent object, the constructionist correspondence criterion is defined as immanent to the process of representation. The deciding question here is whether the representation of a state-of-affairs formally corresponds to the rules of the construction of something as something, understood as the conditions of the possibility of representation in general. According to Rorty, the underlying presupposition in both the case of the realistic as well as the antirealistic concept of correspondence is the acceptance of an "ontological homogeneity" 75 between beliefs and non-beliefs.
The physicalistically arguing realist, "thinks that nothing can correspond to a bit of spatio-temporal reality except by being another bit linked to the first by appropriate causal relationships. Advanced representationalists like John McDowell attempt to reconcile realistic and antirealistic thinkers with one another in a linguistically reflected realism. Rorty describes McDowell's position in relation to the linguistic turn in the following way: "In McDowell's picture, the linguistic turn in philosophy helped us see that nothing is part of the process of justification which does not have a linguistic shape.
It did not, however, take away the need to 'make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. In fact, McDowell's fundamental idea is that the space of experience guarantees "a constraint from outside exercises of spontaneity," 81 which suceeds, "though not from outside what is thinkable, so not from outside the space of concepts. The realistic intuition of the independence of the facts, to which our linguistic statements relate, becomes in this way a determination capable of being made explicit as something which is itself linguistically composed and has the character of interpretation on its side.
If one understands the realistic manner of speaking with McDowell cum grano salis , i. From Rorty's perspective the linguistically difficult rehabilitation of empiricism, which McDowell performs, is "brilliantly original and completely successful.